

Study of the leakage of "top secret" documents in the United States of America

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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to identify and reason about the probable causes of the leakage of classified information in the United States and to find a positive response strategy. Tools such as the DCSA Critical Thinking for Insider Threat Analysis and the Insider Threat Analysis Reasoning Checklist were used to conduct the analysis, which was based on OSINT and supplemented with relevant information obtained from the online community. The study concludes that there are two strategies that can be used to address the question of where the "leaked" documents lead, the basic principle being to determine whether the "leaks" are beneficial to the United States and the existing situation. Or whether there is a loss of classified information to the United States corresponding to the "Secret" or "Top Secret" classification. China can also set up an OODA loop to observe the United States' relevant strategies, or even throw out some contradictory signals to observe the reaction of the United States and its allies. This will provide a scientific basis for making correct decisions in the new round of the game.

KEYWORDS: Leak of "top secret" documents, Political experimentation, Risk management

I. INTRODUCTION

Background to the "leak" incident

The U.S. Department of Defense said on April 10 that the leakage of U.S. classified military documents constitutes a "serious" security risk. The U.S. [1] "New York Times" published an article on April 9, the labeled "classified" or "highly classified" documents from the end of February and early March, including the U.S. assessment of the current plight of the U.S. Army, the serious shortage of ammunition for defense and control, as well as the Russian army in the Bakhmut in the eastern part of U.N. to achieve results. Bakhmut in

eastern Ukraine. Other documents provide detailed analysis of potential British policy in the South China Sea and Houthi activities in Yemen. In addition to information on Ukraine, the documents contain classified "briefing slides" on China, the military situation in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as on the Middle East ([2] internal deliberations in Israel and South Korea) and [3] terrorism revealing or [4] hinting at U.S. intelligence-gathering methods and infiltration. [5] The leak is "a nightmare for the Five Eyes Coalition" The U.S. Department of Justice and the [6] Pentagon have opened an investigation into an apparent online leak of sensitive documents.

Purpose and significance of the study

The purpose of the analysis is to identify and reason about the probable causes of the leakage of classified information in the United States and to find a positive response strategy. If the U.S. intentionally leaks classified information that has been altered, it should be avoided and then prevented from becoming the independent variable of the U.S. use of the so-called "intelligence leaks" to create an observational experiment, and then, through global surveillance, to observe the changes in the dependent variable, and then to study the response of the object (the dependent variable) (China, Russia, the U.S., India and the Pacific, NATO allies, etc.) and strive to formulate the correct decision-making in the new round of the game to obtain a scientific basis. In order to make the right decision in the new round of the game to obtain a scientific basis. Preventing and controlling the possibility of the U.S. using "leaks" to conduct political experiments and build relational models. If we can effectively determine the reasons or motives for the US leaks, it will have a positive impact on deciding which strategy to use in response, and whether to assess the significance of the leaks when making important decisions.

II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Question 1: From the perspective of OSINT, was the leak subjective and intentional, and was it an intentional targeted dissemination of so-called "leaks" by falsifying or altering real information?

Question 2: If the "leaks" are actively manipulated, what kind of effect does the United States want to achieve, and what specific objectives does it want to achieve?

Question 3: If the "leaks" are actively manipulated, what kind of observation experiment is the United States conducting and what kind of observation is it trying to obtain?

Question 4: For China, is it better to block the "leaked" information and stick to the original decision-making program or add a backup program, or modify the original decision-making program?

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

Subject of the study

Before analyzing we first determined the source of the risk versus internal, that is, that the breach was triggered by an internal threat. The basis for this judgment.

1. [7] Some officials said the documents cover a wide range of topics, including the war in Ukraine, China, the Middle East and Africa, which suggests that the leakers may be Americans rather than their allies. [8] Former senior Pentagon official Michael Mulroy (Michael Mulroy) told Reuters reporter confidentiality is very much inside the United States can be internal leaks: "because many documents are only in the hands of the Americans".
2. The United States has a robust defense security situation management system, where classified documents and mandatory controlled unclassified documents are subject to the DCSA's Counterintelligence Security Service (CISA) designated and repeatedly tested procedures and standards. The possibility of obtaining them through external infiltration is very low.

Research methodology

1. In identifying the source as an insider threat, we used tools such as the U.S. Department of Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency DCSA Insider Threat Analysis Critical Thinking and Insider Threat Analysis Reasoning Checklist to analyze the above questions.

2. The analysis is based on OSINT, supplemented by relevant information obtained from the online community.

Research procedures

This study uses DCSA's Insider Threat Analyst Critical Newness Thinking methodology to execute the procedure as follows:

1. Collect relevant information.
2. assess the accuracy and timeliness of the information.
3. Ask questions
4. assess bias or unsubstantiated assumptions.
5. interpret and draw inferences from information.
6. develop a theory of mind.
7. weigh opinions, arguments, or solutions against criteria.
8. consider alternative possibilities.
9. test conclusions to verify that evidence supports them.
10. make judgements

IV. FINDINGS

Apply research methods to analyze research questions in multiple ways

Question 1: From the perspective of OSINT, was the leak subjective and intentional, and was it an intentional targeted dissemination of so-called "leaks" by falsifying or altering real information?

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Question 3: If the "leaks" are actively manipulated, what kind of observation experiment is the United States conducting and what kind of observation is it trying to obtain?

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The research procedure was used as a structural element in the study, and due to the uncertainty of the material, the author is conducting a mixed study of the above four issues, which will be categorized one by one in the conclusion of the study for a targeted description. The research procedures followed in the study are those identified in the above research methodology and design for critical thinking in insider threat analysis as follows:

Research Procedure 1: Gathering Relevant Information

BASIC FACTS DETERMINED: "These photos show a file format that appears to be similar to the one used to provide our senior leaders with daily updates on Ukraine- and Russia-related operations, as well as other intelligence updates,"

said Chris Meagher, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs Miguel . Miguel said, "I'm not going to accurately categorize for you the group of people who have access to this material. I'll just say It's highly classified and sensitive material that people in the Department of Defense, of course, and other aspects of the

U.S. government use to inform their work." Breaking Defense reports that "some" of the material "appears to have been altered," but Miguel declined to elaborate. The Times reports that in some versions, online casualty figures for Ukraine and Russia appear to have been altered.

Research process 2: Assessing the accuracy and timeliness of information

The above information comes from media reports on April 9-April 10, and these media outlets are highly reliable and do not add strong subjective descriptions to their reports, meeting the requirements of accuracy and timeliness.

According to the former staff officer of the Planning Department of the Norwegian Defense Staff, member of the Board of Directors of the Ukrainian Institute for Security and Law of the Sea, former Norwegian Defense Attaché in Ukraine, officer of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and non-resident researcher at the Center for Defense Strategies (CDS) Hans Peter Mittens , as of April 11 (the latest) 412th Day Morning documented, we can see that the Nordic countries have a relatively independent and representative source of intelligence and analysis.

Research procedure 3: Formulation of the question

The purpose and directionality of some of the leaked files were analyzed, and some of the leaked files are listed below:

"Leaked documents show that Ukraine's air defenses will be in danger if it is not strengthened," according to one of the leaked documents. The stockpile of missiles for Soviet-era S-300 and Buk air defenses, which account for 89 percent of Ukraine's protection for most fighters and some bombers, is expected to be fully depleted. The document, released on Feb. 28, was based on an assessment of the depletion rates at that time. It is unclear whether those rates have changed. The same document assessed that Ukrainian air defenses designed to protect frontline forces, where most of Russia's air power is concentrated, would be "completely weakened" by May 23, leading to strains in the air defense network deep into Ukrainian territory. [9] If that happens, officials said, Moscow could decide that it is finally safe for

its prized fighters and bombers to enter the battlefield and directly threaten the outcome of the ground war.

This part of the information has a high degree of overall authenticity, except for the dates involved. The goal of the document was to address domestic and international pressures for U.S. or NATO warplane assistance to Ukraine. In other words, the U.S. needed a "leaked document" endorsing the urgency of aid to Ukrainian warplanes as a turning point for critical change, which is consistent with the first step of the Harvard Kohler 8-step model of change, which is to create a sense of urgency. This, in turn, sets the stage for the formation of a strong coalition. According to this judgment, the "leak" event is just a part of the change strategy designed by the U.S. to meet the international crisis. That is, the United States began to use Kohler's theory to enter the change management program for the crisis.



Kotter's 8-Step Change Model in A Nutshell

Research Procedure 4: Assessing bias or unsubstantiated assumptions

On the question of the bias of the "leaked" document, Hans-Peter Mittens stated in the Morning Post of Day 412: "I really don't understand why everyone says that this "leak" is about the counter-offensive, because strategically everyone is talking about the counter-offensive, but operational tactical data and programs are completely absent from the public space. I really don't understand why everyone is saying that this "leak" is about the counter-offensive, because strategically everyone is talking about the counter-offensive, but operational tactical data and scenarios are completely absent from the public space, and there is no way that they could have actually existed, because the counter-offensive is still being prepared, and there is an accumulation of reserves and resources and so on. And to say that anyone has a clear understanding of where, what

and how Ukraine will do directly on the battlefield is strange to say, says Podoliak." From Minton's analysis, we can see that the "leak" of so-called classified documents in the US points to what most people understand to be a prelude to a "counter-offensive" rather than to the arrival of a crisis and an opportunity for the US to create change in order to get out of this crisis. Of course, whether these two separate analyses are hypotheses or not requires more factual verification. The core of the so-called bias problem here is that the judgment of the security of the U.S. intelligence system, that is "leaked" is the default, the basic fact that classified documents were "leaked", and artificial is to "leaked! "Under the guise of "leaking", those who are secretly hiding in plain sight are relying on the objective fact that the "leaked" documents have been altered. Both have their own basis, are not prejudicial expression, can be regarded as two dimensions of the risk judgment, can be used to material dialectics linkage, comprehensive, the development of the point of view of a comprehensive analysis, without preconceived judgments.

Research Procedure 5: Interpreting and Drawing Inferences from Information

An important basis for our view that the "leak" was a proactive choice by the US to enter into a crisis of change is whether the US is moving towards a "favourable" or a "passive" situation as a result of the incident. "unfavourable"? Based on the fact that "in an effort to bolster Ukraine's air defences, the Biden administration announced last week that it would send additional air interceptors and munitions as part of a \$2.6 billion aid package", we can see that after the "leak", the whole situation is more conducive to the United States. After the "leak", the whole situation is more conducive for the United States to achieve a more favourable climate for aid to Ukrainian warplanes, reducing international noise and implementation risks, benefiting the arms dealers behind it, and meeting the needs of the United States to continue expanding the war in Ukraine. In terms of "gains", this is not really a "leak" that caused the US to suffer significant losses, but rather a positive gain. Therefore, we arrive at a hypothetical judgement that is based on facts, which are not proven (and cannot be proven at this time), but which has a certain degree of reliability, that the "leaks" are either a transformative strategy planned by the United States intelligence system or a strategy of the United States intelligence system.

Research Procedure 6: Developing a Theory of Mind


Hypothetical judgements, planned "leaks".

[10] "In fact, the assessment in another leaked Pentagon document puts the number of Russian fighters currently deployed in the Ukrainian theatre at 485, compared to 85 Ukrainian fighters." In analysing the "leaks" of classified US documents, we have created two hypotheses of opposite dimensions, and why hypotheses? At present, the outside world can not be confirmed. The "leak" that the outside world is talking about is just a perception based on the one-way dissemination of the US Department of Defense, which is also the formal purpose of the US Department of Defense, at least for now, they have completed the cognitive guidance of the public at the social level, that is, the majority of the people think that the "leak" for the What really happened. In the first dimension, we make the assumption that "leaks" of classified U.S. documents are true, and if they are true, they must have a significant adverse impact on the U.S. If they do not have a factual impact on the desired U.S. goals, they are not really classified at all, but rather are used for "leaks" of simulated secrets. If there is no factual impact on the desired goals of the United States, then these secrets are not really secrets at all, but simulated secrets used to "leak" secrets. This can be used as a principle of judgement in analysing and studying the issue. The Counterintelligence and Security Agency of the United States Department of Defense talks about "real" and "fake" in its courses, in which it is said that it is very easy to identify something if it is fake, but the key is to make something fake out of something real, which is very difficult to identify. This is also the reason why Hans-Peter Mittens said in the Morning Post that "according to Podoljak, the published documents partly look like analysed documents". The authors of this article judge that the so-called "leaked" documents of the U.S. Department of Defense may not be "classified" and "top secret" documents at all, but rather a combination of some of the "mandatory controlled unclassified" documents. "mandatory controlled unclassified information" to raise the level of confidentiality, stored in classified information, and then through the fishing way, let these information "leak", that is, can be manipulated "leakage This is a manipulative "leak", and so the drama that everyone knows today was played out.

This judgement is supported by the following: "How the latest leaked documents differ from past leaks, the New York Times reports: This new batch of more than 100 leaked briefing slides

of operational data on the war in Ukraine is markedly different from WikiLeaks. The data disclosed so far is not as comprehensive as those in the massive secret dossier, but it's more up-to-date. What worries White House and Pentagon officials most is the immediate salience of the information. Some of the most sensitive material - maps of Ukraine's air defences and an in-depth study of South Korea's secret plan to provide 330,000 rounds of much-needed munitions in time for the Ukrainian spring counter-offensive - was disclosed in documents that appear to be less than 40 days old." (This information falls far short of top secret and is at best mandatory controlled unclassified information.)

Based on the above analysis, the authors of this paper believe that the United States intelligence system is using the "Observe, Orient, Decide, Act" (OODA) loop theory to conduct information warfare. The OODA loop model is described as follows:



OODA Loop Model

The OODA cycle (Observational Orientation Decision Approach) is an information strategy concept for information warfare developed by Colonel John Boyd of the United States Air Force (USAF). According to Boyd, decision-making occurs in an iterative cycle of "observation-direction-decision-behaviour". Individuals or organisations dealing with this cycle can observe and respond to unfolding events faster than the adversary, thereby "entering" the adversary's decision cycle to gain an advantage.

Take this "leak" incident, the U.S. Department of Defense and intelligence agencies can release these information bombs (adversary assessment is time-consuming) to manipulate their own long-set independent variables, by observing the behavior of the adversary - dependent variables, to obtain more data for the next "military chess projections" need strategic elements or decision-making judgment points. By observing the

behavior of the adversary - the dependent variable - they can obtain more data on the strategic elements or decision points needed to make the next "wargaming" move. To resolve existing U.S. dilemmas, address issues of uncertainty, and validate the adversary's intelligence capabilities and levels of intelligence. Then choose the best time to send foreign military simulations, i.e., "blue troops" into the opponent's OODA cycle (can be multiple blue troops), to reset the game with the opponent's thinking, to advance the level of war, and to fully grasp the opponent's tempo. Gain more initiative for U.S. military combat strategy and combat forces, and incorporate AI for decision-making and simulation. Provide the U.S. Department of Defense with more simulation results on a daily basis to gain strategic and tactical advantage.

Back in 1998 the U.S. Joint Military Intelligence College (now the National Intelligence University, which is part of the U.S. Department of Defense) singled out a discussion paper titled "Military Chess Projections and Intelligence Education" authored by Jonathan S. Lockwood, PhD and Lt. Col. Donald J. Hanle, USAF, in which they addressed the point that "Military Chess projections and their use in professional military education have a long and venerable history, but their use in the intelligence field has never been more widespread. This is unfortunate because military chess projection, whether a commercial 'board game' or a computer game, can demonstrate the true importance of strategic and tactical intelligence through its inherent ability to demonstrate the force multiplier that intelligence brings to the tactical, operational, and strategic dimensions of war." They began during that period will attempting to apply military chess projection to intelligence. Coincidentally, this "leak" of classified US intelligence first occurred on the Discord platform, a communication and collaboration tool for gamers. Accordingly, we can put forward a hypothesis that the person behind the classified account O.G. should have been trained in "military chess deduction", and in the design and execution of the "classified" link, a knowledge mapping was generated, and it was decided to use the game platform communication tool as the initial entry point. This reasoning is logical to a certain extent, but it is a hypothesis that can be verified for the time being.

The recent U.S. global "call for scholarship" on the subject of China's Strategic Support Forces (SSF) implies that little is known about the functioning of the SSF, which has even become a key determinant of the design of warfare.

Boyd developed this concept to explain how to channel one's energy to defeat an opponent and survive. Boyd emphasized that a "cycle" is actually a set of interaction cycles that will remain in continuous operation during combat. He also points out that the phase of combat has a significant impact on the ideal distribution of energy. Boyd's diagrams show that all decisions are based on observations of the evolving situation and implicitly filter the problem being solved. These observations are the raw information upon which decisions and actions are based. The observed information must be processed and oriented for further decision-making. The current U.S. Department of Defense "leaks" have created an excellent opportunity for global forces to intervene on a "unified platform" to bring previously fragmented data back to a more accessible level through disruptive "leaks". The "leaks" have created an excellent opportunity for global forces to intervene on a "unified platform", bringing previously fragmented data back into the U.S. military's control through disruptive "leaks".

Boyd believes that OODA loops enable a person to disrupt and short-circuit an opponent's thought processes by entering their OODA loop and taking control of the situation. This cues the adversary to move in a particular way and provides them with the opportunity to react inappropriately. If the U.S.'s main competitor and its NATO allies, non-NATO allies, and Indo-Pacific minor NATO allies, believe that the "leaks" are truly "Top Secret" and "Classified" documents, the U.S. can achieve the goal of disrupting their thinking and making them think. The U.S. will be able to achieve the goal of interfering with them so that they can short-circuit their thinking and fail to make the right judgement. If his competitors really try to find various channels to verify these "leaked" so-called "top secret" and "classified" information, then, for example, they will have to spend a lot of resources and manpower, and they will certainly have a higher probability of exposing their hidden talents. There is a high probability of exposing the agents lurking in the United States, which is like the "urn city" encountered in the ancient Chinese war, which will cause great losses. What about the United States Department of Defence? I am afraid that by merely "leaking" some of the mandatory controlled unclassified information or some classified information of poor timeliness in a systematic manner, it has interfered with the judgement of all countries in the world and achieved multiple purposes.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Research process 7: Weighing opinions, arguments or solutions against criteria

This study weighs the eight criteria of the Insider Threat Analyst's Reasoning Checklist and the six principles of accuracy, objectivity, usability, relevance, readiness, and timeliness of intelligence, and includes observations, arguments, and recommended solutions in the conclusions of the above analysis.

Question 1: From the perspective of OSINT, was the leak subjective and intentional, and was it an intentional targeted dissemination of so-called "leaks" by falsifying or altering real information?

In this paper, the raw material used in the research is derived from open source information, but some of the information is intelligence-type information shared by real-named Internet users in specialized social media groups, e.g., Hans Peter Mittens, former staff officer in the Planning Department of the Norwegian Defense Staff, former Norwegian Defense Attaché to the Ukraine, officer in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Defense Strategies, as of the 412th day of the Morning Report on April 11th (the most recent). His information-gathering channels are predominantly public, with the help of close contacts, and are assessed to be highly reliable OSINT intelligence based on verification by long-term observation and assessment in accordance with Intelligence 6 principles.

Conclusion of the study on question 1: The leakage incident has a greater possibility of subjective intentional "leakage", and the "leakage" incident involves "top secret" and "confidential" level information combined with timeliness control. The "leak" incident involves "top secret" and "confidential" grade information combined with timeliness control, and its actual grade or only belongs to the "mandatory controlled unclassified information" grade, or belongs to the so-called "classified" that is artificially upgraded and then arranged to be leaked, "Top secret" information.

Question 2: If the "leaks" are actively manipulated, what kind of effect does the United States want to achieve, and what specific objectives does it want to achieve?

Conclusion of the study on question 2: By manipulating the "leaks", four main goals were achieved. First, with the help of the "leaked documents", to create the necessity and urgency of assisting Ukraine with advanced warplanes, i.e., the U.S. acquisition of air power in Ukraine, in order to prepare the alliance for winning the initiative in the next stage of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Second, the U.S. with the "leaks" incident into the crisis

management change program. Third, through the "leak" document content to manipulate the independent variable to observe the dependent variable of the observation experiment. That is, to manipulate the "leaked" documents and altered documents directed leaks, to observe the reaction of competitors. Entering the opponent's OODA loop and controlling the situation to interfere with and short-circuit the opponent's thinking process. Test rival intelligence capabilities and counter-intelligence capabilities, fragmentation of international intelligence information, in a short period of time, leveling, in preparation for the reorganization of the next round of "military chess" deduction, to promote the war level, and fully grasp the rhythm of the opponent. To the U.S. military combat strategy and combat troops to win more initiative. Fourth, the implementation of fishing strategy, inducing rivals to start the possible lurking in the United States to investigate the internal espionage personnel, for strangulation.

Question 3: If the "leaks" are actively manipulated, what kind of observation experiment is the United States conducting and what kind of observation is it trying to obtain?

Conclusion of the study on question 3: Assuming that the "leak" is actively manipulated, it is more likely that the United States is conducting the OODA cycle of close and personal observation experiments, and will inject the relevant reconnaissance information into the artificial intelligence system to add more data for the military chess projections. The United States will certainly observe the "leak" event in the social media, traditional media, the world's mainstream media on the event's reaction and the continuous fermentation process. And accordingly study the sensitive issue of military intelligence in the current situation, to obtain the more the collection point, the peak, the cycle, the effect of guidance and so on comprehensive issues. At the same time, it will observe the reaction of the intelligence communities of various countries and the relevant measures through its sleeper agents. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the strategy under the environment of information war and cognitive war will be judged, and the next step of tool development will be considered.

Research procedure 8: Consideration of alternative possibilities

There are three core judgments about the origins of the United States "leaks": true, false, and a mixture of true and false. The alternative conclusions to be considered are described below:

Question 4: For China, is it better to block the "leaked" information and stick to the original

decision-making program or add a backup program, or modify the original decision-making program?

Conclusion of the study on question 4: This study concludes that there are two strategies that can be used to address the question of where the "leaked" document leads, the basic principle being to determine whether the "leak" is beneficial to the United States and the existing situation. The basic principle is to determine whether the "leak" is beneficial to the United States and the situation at hand, or whether there is a loss of classified information to the United States that would be commensurate with a "Secret" or "Top Secret" classification! If there is no corresponding loss of leaks, it can be judged that this is positioned with the "classified", "top secret" leaks are only a kind of intelligence manipulation tactics. Then for our country this "leak" can only cause interference, so the authors believe that we can also set an OODA loop on the U.S. related strategies to observe, and even throw out some contradictory signals, to observe the United States and its allies to respond.

Research Procedure 9: Testing the findings to verify that the evidence supports the conclusions

Through the test, we believe that the findings of this paper and the related evidence, reasoning, etc. can support the research conclusions.

Research process 10: Making judgments.

Specific judgments have been included in the conclusion of the article.

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