

# Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Northeast Nigeria: ‘A Case Study of Boko Haram Insurgency’

Lydia Daniel

Date of Submission: 05-04-2024

Date of Acceptance: 14-04-2024

## ABSTRACT

The research examined the “Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Northeast Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram Insurgency” The study emphasized more on the period between 2009 and 2017. The study's overall objective is to examine violence extremism and radicalization of North East Nigeria. The study adopted the Conspiracy Theory as its theoretical framework and employed secondary means of data collection. The data were generated and analyzed using both descriptive and content analysis in the themes. From the findings, the study revealed that Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes politics in Nigeria has been hijacked by a group of corrupt and false Muslims; and also, that Westernization country has bred corruption in Nigerian politics and therefore wants to wage war against Westernization of all sorts in the country by creating a menace in the country. In northeast Nigeria, Boko Haram-related terrorism and insurgency are pressing and potentially growing threats that could develop even stronger international links. The violence in the six states across the northeast risks creating even further religious and ethnic tension in other states across Nigeria. The government should embark on mass employment of youth so that they will no longer be ready tools in the hands of desperate politicians or religious zealots.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Security is very important in the survival of a nation. The challenges of violent extremism and radicalism are becoming globally enormous. ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab are among the global terrorist groups. The global phenomenon has given rise to nations seeking measures to counter such a narrative that is not limited to security moves (Chiemelie, 2018). Conversely, violent extremist agitations include a wide range of issues, including politics, religion, and gender relations. According to the U.S. government commission that

investigated the September 11 attacks, violent extremism is on the rise despite costly U.S. military action in global peace and fight against the religious extremist groups.

In Africa, the rise in violent extremism is consumed to be a reaction to states' inability to provide security and services, and has little to do with religious ideology, a new report by the peacebuilding charity International Alert has found. Dubawa (2018). argued that in the Fulani communities in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the reason young people may or may not choose to join an armed group is because of state abuse and unchecked corruption which are the main factors behind some young people's decision to join armed groups (Dubawa, 2018).

The perceived abuse by government authorities, often with impunity, has led to frustrations and violent extremism. Moreover, a complete lack of trust among the communities in the defense and security forces has also prompted a stark approach to tackling violent extremism in the region. While poverty and unemployment are widespread, it also became a stronger motivation for young people to join armed groups. This is because unemployment is heavily stigmatized across the region. However, belonging to a violent extremist group does not always translate into having more money (Dubawa, 2018).

The study examined the impact of violent extremism and radicalization by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the root causes of these violent acts of extremism and radicalization by the Boko Haram insurgency, and the various efforts in place by the government to curb the menace. Efforts were also, made to determine the extent to which government effort has helped in finding lasting solutions to violent extremism and radicalization by the Boko Haram insurgency, and solutions were suggested to the challenges.

In Nigeria, violent extremists have been considered terrorists, while others viewed it as

radicalization which includes opposition to the social norms that are contradictory to the Islamic model or order (Salihi, 2012). Before 2009, the activities of the Boko Haram group were peaceful and confined to advocacy through preaching and mobilization for membership. However, in the past years, the activities of the Boko Haram sects have turned sadistic, very violent, deadly, and daring with immense concentration in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria (Punch, 2015).

Violent extremism and radicalization by the group have manifested in different forms, such as outright massive attacks on police stations, police and military barracks, markets, and educational institutions and targeted bomb attacks on government buildings, motor stations, churches, mosques, banks, and filling stations. The sect has also expressed its violent character through the individual and mass abduction of prominent personalities like traditional leaders and clerics, school children and foreigners, suicide bombing using teenage girls and cars loaded with explosives, detonating improvised explosive devices at strategic locations, and so on (Punch, 2015).

**The consequences** of these radicalization and attacks have been devastating. Apart from the huge economic losses incurred as a result of insurgent attacks on infrastructure with grave effects on development in the northeast and could take years to rectify (Tell Newspaper, 2013); the collapse of economic activities in Northeastern Nigeria, in particular, has been thrown into a state of inertia because of heightened insecurity due to violent extremism and radicalization. Similarly, the high level of human casualty is also associated with violent extremism and radicalization, Boko Haram and its separate ISIS-West Africa faction have been terrorizing northeast Nigeria since 2009 till date. Thousands of people have been kidnapped, schoolchildren and aid workers inclusive, Boko Haram has displaced more than 2.2 million people within Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad Basin due to insurgent violence by the group on the one hand, and counter-insurgent activities by security operatives, on the other. The insurgency has also disrupted the school system, schools were forced to close in the Northeastern part of Nigeria, especially in Borno and Yobe States for fear of attacks, thereby jeopardizing the educational future of the majority of the children. Finally, Nigeria's international image has further been battered as the country has been ranked by the London-based Institute for Economics and Peace on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) for 2017 as the fourth most

terrorized nation in the world due to serial insurgent attacks in the north.

This has potentially deterred investors and tourists from coming to Nigeria (Punch, 2015).

Several researches carried out on violent extremism and radicalization, most of which were carried out in an attempt to properly place the phenomenon of insurgency in its theoretical framework or model formulation. However, little has been done in recent times by researchers to explain the critical component of culture that empowers Boko Haram's cognitive reasoning capacity which justifies the commission of criminal acts (Punch, 2015).

In recent times, violent extremism and radicalization have been identified with activities such as 'Jihad' (unholy War) 'Massacre' 'Crusade' Armed group' 'suicide mission' 'banditry' Boko Haram 'Bank breaks' 'looting' Prison breaks, bombing, serial killing, massacre, Armed group, high profile assassination and destruction of critical public infrastructure particularly in North Eastern region of Nigeria, especially by Boko Haram has brought about tears and sorrow among the citizenry and calls for good understanding (Dada and Ibanga, 2011). It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to critically investigate violent extremism and radicalization of Northeast Nigeria, a study of Boko Haram insurgency

The study is **imperative** as it benefits the Nigerian government and the public in understanding the nature and the character of violent extremism and radicalization through insurgency and the need to enhance the necessary support for controlling violent extremism, serves as a guide to appreciating the need for international participation in putting an end to the menace and the Military and civil society in their quest to quell the tenacity of terrorism (Boko Haram insurgency) as it affects the socio-economic development of the country. This study also helps to proffer strategic solutions that will enhance the fight against Boko Haram and other insurgencies. Theoretically, this study will be useful to writers, scholars, journalists, etc. to add to existing knowledge.

## II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

### Conceptualization of Violent Extremism

Violent extremism refers to the beliefs and actions of people who support or use ideologically motivated violence to achieve radical ideological, religious, or political views. Violent extremist views can be exhibited along a range of issues, including politics, religion, and gender relations. No society, religious community, or worldview is

immune to violent extremism. Though “radicalization” is a contested term to some, it has come to be used to define the process through which an individual or a group considers violence as a legitimate and desirable means of action. Radical thought that does not condone the exercise of violence to further political goals may be seen as normal and acceptable, and be promoted by groups working within the boundaries of the law. It is often used as a code name for Islamic terrorism (Carter, 2013)

#### Conceptualization of Radicalization

Radicalization is a process by which an individual, or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or contemporary ideas and expressions of the nation. The outcomes of radicalization are shaped by the ideas of the society at large; for example, radicalism can originate from a broad social consensus against progressive changes in society or from a broad desire for change in society. Radicalization can be both violent and nonviolent, although most academic literature focuses on radicalization into violent extremism (RVE). Multiple pathways constitute the process of radicalization, which can be independent but are usually mutually reinforcing (McCauley et al, 2008).

#### Conceptualization of Insurgency

It is noteworthy that not all rebellions are insurgencies. Non-violent rebellions are known to use other strategies like civil resistance to achieve their goals. Recent examples are the revolution in the Philippines around the 1980’s which ousted President Marcos and the Egyptian revolution of 2011. Insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority recognized as such by other nations mostly the United Nations, whereas the other parties taking part in such rebellion are not recognized. The concept of insurgency has undergone kaleidoscopic trends over the years, the word has in recent times been frequently used interchangeably with terrorism which has of late become a constant phenomenon in several parts of the world. To Hoffman, insurgency or terrorism, as the case may be, may be seen as a violent act that is conceived specifically to attract attention and then, through the publicity it generates, to communicate a message (Hoffman, 1988, 1999).

Terrorism or violent extremism encompasses violent behaviors that originate in an ideology

shared at least by a limited group of individuals. Violent extremism includes the willingness as well as training, preparation, and the actual conduct of violent acts against civilians. Terrorists show a severe disconnect from society and tend to devalue or dehumanize their victims. Historically, individuals turned to terrorism when they saw no other possibility to achieve a specific political goal (Crenshaw and LaFree, 2016).

Factors Leading to Violent Extremism and Radicalization There are however several common factors, facilitators, and events in the process of radicalization, which may or may not result in violent extremism:

- i. **Structural Factors:** long-term, fixed factors that instill a sense of injustice in individuals at risk of radicalization. Examples of these include demographic imbalances, poverty, inequality, discrimination, polarized environments, and transitional societies. It is important to emphasize that not all individuals who share this sense of injustice become radicals: most will ignore their grievances or seek a political outlet to articulate them. Only a few turn to violent extremism and even fewer to terrorism. This makes radicalization incredibly difficult to predict. (Crenshaw, 2017).
- ii. **Facilitating or Accelerating Causes:** The internet has made radical messages available to the global public while encryption technologies make some messages undetectable. Low-cost air travel has enabled aspiring individuals to travel to schools, training camps, or areas that are central to the particular radical discourse, for instance, conflict zones.
- iii. **Motivating Factors,** playing on structural grievances, bring an individual closer to extremism through a process of indoctrination. For example, radical political leaders or radical preachers who incite hate and intolerant beliefs or ideologies fall into this category.

**Trigger Events:** Research has pointed to the importance of **trigger events:** assignificant acts that have an intense emotional impact on the individual at risk. These events can encourage someone to take "the final step" toward (violent) extremism. A well-known case is Mohammed Bouerj, who murdered the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. His radicalization process was partly triggered by the death of his mother. The process leading to violent extremism includes various structural, motivating, and triggering

factors that go hand in hand with a personal “depluralization”. At the end of this radicalization process, the use of violence has become necessary and urgent and is considered to be the last resort to change the status quo (Crenshaw, 2017).

### Insurgency and the Campaign of Terror in North Eastern Nigeria

The menace of Jama’atuAhlis Sunna Lidda’awatiwal-Jihad (JASLAW), widely referred to as ‘Boko Haram insurgency’ is at center stage, Under the sect’s leader, the late Mohammed Yusuf, the JASLAW group also known as as the Yusuffiya, vigorously indoctrinated considerable followers with the campaign of Western education is sin.The Boko Haram insurgency was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist group advocating strict Sharia law and opposing the westernizing of Nigerian society which accounts for the name ‘Boko Haram insurgency’ meaning ‘Western Education is forbidden’. Yusuf used existing infrastructure in Borno of the Izala society, a

popular conservative Islamic sect originally welcomed into government to recruit members before breaking away to form his faction. However, the sect initially operated in a quietist nature, conducting its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. They then withdrew from society into remote north-eastern areas but were soon to change into a Salafist-Jihadi group known for terrorist attacks since 2009 with the political goal of creating an Islamic state (Orsini 2013). The activities of the Boko Haram insurgency sect are known to destructively attack churches, mosques, schools, police stations government, international agencies, motor parks, market squares, and other highly populated places, private and public-owned facilities with a kind of guerrilla warfare tactics. (Sahara Reporter, April 21, 2014). The group’s weaponry includes bombs, arms, and ammunition of various degrees of lethal capacity. The activities of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria have brought about insecurity, a state of emergency, loss of lives and properties, etc.

**Table 1: Outline of Some Boko Haram Insurgency Attacks in Nigeria since 2009**

Date (Timeline of Attack Incidents)	Place, Nature, and Casualties
7th September, 2010	Bauchi prison break where Boko Haram insurgency freed 700 prisoners
31st December, 2010	December 2010 Abuja Attack
17th June, 2012	Suicide Bombers strike three churches in Kaduna. At least 50 people were Killed
17th June, 2012	130 bodies were found in Plateau state. It is presumed they were killed by Boko Haram insurgent Terrorists.
19th April, 2013	Deadliest attack since 2009: gun battle with security forces leaves 260 dead and nearly 1000 injured in Borno.
7th May, 2013	At least 55 were killed and 105 inmates were freed in coordinated attacks in army barracks, prison, and police post in Bama town.
14th January, 2014	At least 31 people were killed, and over 50 people were injured by a suicide bombing in Maiduguri, Borno State
16th February, 2014	Izghe massacre: 106 killed
14th April, 2014	2014 Chibok kidnapping: Government properties including the only girls’ Secondary school attacked. At least 16 were killed or missing and 234 female Students were kidnapped. The Boko Haram insurgency militants said it would treat the Assaults
25 <sup>th</sup> Dec 2015	Bicycling gunmen raided a village on Christmas and burned down all houses, in Kimba, Borno.
13 <sup>th</sup> February, 2016	During multiple attacks, worshippers were forced into a mosque and shot, Borno, 30 killed
From January to February 2019	At least 60 people were killed following the 28 January devastating Boko Haram attack on Rann, a border town in Borno state, northeast Nigeria, Amnesty International has confirmed

Researcher, 2019

### The study adopted the conspiracy theory

A conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy generally one involving an illegal or harmful act supposedly carried out by the government or other powerful actors without credible evidence. According to the political scientist Michael Barkun, conspiracy theories rely on the view that the universe is governed by design, and embody three principles: nothing happens by accident, nothing is as it seems, and everything is connected (Barkun, 2003).

A conspiracy theory may take any matter as its subject, but certain subjects attract greater interest than others. Favored subjects include famous deaths, government activities, new technologies, terrorism, and questions of alien life. In his book The Open Society and Its Enemies, the philosopher Karl Popper used the term "the conspiracy theory of society" to denote a conception of social phenomena that he found to be defective-- namely, that social phenomena such as "war, unemployment, poverty, shortages ... [are] the result of direct design by some powerful individuals and groups." Popper argued that totalitarianism was founded on "conspiracy theories" that drew on imaginary plots driven by paranoid scenarios predicated on tribalism, chauvinism, or racism. Popper acknowledged that genuine conspiracies do exist, but noted how infrequently conspirators have been able to achieve their goals (Popper Karl, 1945).

This study considered the conspiracy theory for its uniqueness in analyzing cases of radicalism and extreme violence in insurgency. Among the longest-standing and most widely recognized conspiracy theories are notions concerning the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the 1969 Apollo moon landings, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as numerous theories about alleged plots for world domination by various groups both real and imaginary.

Applying the theory, the insurgency, which has claimed more than 30,000 lives, with a further two million internally displaced persons, and crippled the socio-economic life of the people of the Northeast geo-political zone, has often been misunderstood. Beginning in 2010, the violent extremism and radicalization of the Boko Haram insurgent and terror group have engaged the Nigerian government in a protracted war of attrition.

The fundamental misunderstanding of the terror group and misinterpretation of its motive by the various interest groups and stakeholders have

aided and abetted, if not strengthened, the group, and the result has been an intractability of the war. In the early days of the insurgency, Boko Haram enjoyed some form of legitimacy among a significant section of the people of Borno state and environs because their doctrine of rejecting Western education and lifestyle was simply a continuation of an already existing religious sentiment preached and taught among the predominantly Muslim populace of the area; that was why their grouse was initially viewed as a result of local religious issues which found expression in politics involving principally the former governor of the state, Ali Modu Sheriff. Following the security crackdown on the group and the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, their leader, in the process, the stage was set for an endless war.

It was beginning with isolated terror acts targeted at political allies and followers of Sheriff, their avowed enemy. The predominantly Muslim populace of Borno saw this as a confrontation between the Boko Haram sect and the Sheriff and sympathized with the group, which appears to be oppressed by the state. When the group graduated to attacking security agencies and other government targets, this fitted well into the already pre-existing anti-government sentiments prevalent among the populace. However, the group expanded its violent activities to Christians and their places of worship, it was received with indifference because that also fitted into the religious bias, intolerance, and resentment of people of other faiths that is pervasive among the predominantly Muslim populace of the region.

The Jonathan administration mistakenly viewed the Boko Haram insurgency through the narrow prism of partisan politics. It was interpreted as the North's response to the loss of power. The blunder was highlighted by then NSA, Owoye Azazi. Speaking in Asaba, Delta state capital, during the South-south economic summit in April 2012, he attempted to link the Boko Haram insurgency to the power struggle within PDP, by muddling up the terror group's activities with the post-election violence. Jonathan was fixated on this narrative that for a long time, he treated the issue politically, by being none too committed to finding a lasting solution to the insurgency. This was viewed by Jonathan as a self-inflicted crisis aimed at discrediting his administration and was observed to be conspiracy ideas through negligence to act.

Furthermore, this impression by the presidency was largely responsible for the non-implementation of Ambi Usman Gaji Galtimari's report, which substantially addressed the remote

and near causes as well as short- and long-term solutions to the problem. The larger Muslim community in Nigeria helped, in no small measure, to add to the confusion by consistently denouncing members of the sect as non-Muslims. The living in denial by the Muslim community in Nigeria compounded the issue immensely.

The conspiracy theory was promoted by some sects widely believed by many to the effect that enemies of Islam, possibly aided and abetted by the Jonathan presidency, were responsible for the Boko Haram insurgency to give the religion of Islam a bad image.

### III. METHODOLOGY

#### Design

This study evaluates data relating to violent extremism and radicalization in North Eastern Nigeria about the Boko Haram insurgency. Also, the study includes an evaluation of the historical analysis of Nigeria's policy implementation for national security in northeastern Nigeria, the pattern of violent extremism and radicalization, and the Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria through the evaluation of relevant theoretical literature. The literature includes documented evidence of the situations in North Eastern Nigeria.

Therefore, this study adopts the descriptive and analytical Methods of Research; this is because of the need to be objective in the analyses of inter-state collaboration in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism. It is in line with this objective that the study adopts the descriptive analysis. This is aimed at providing an objective and systematic examination and analysis of the content of government-recorded information, journal publications, and newspapers.

#### Sources of Data Collection

In using the descriptive approach, the study consists of secondary data generated from the internet, journals, and unpublished thesis amongst others which will be on the subject matter of the thesis, the trends and factors that have motivated violent extremism and radicalization through Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria.

### IV. DATA ANALYSIS

This study therefore employed the document and content analysis. Data from secondary sources were obtained and analyzed by document. The use of this method is to enable the researcher to obtain complementary information which is hoped would enhance the quality of the research finding. Collected data were analyzed

qualitatively and presented in a logical form. In analyzing the data collected, the study employed content validity to analyze the data collected. The aim is to ascertain the extent to which the instrument use is suitable for use in the context of this study. Islam and the historical interplay of politics and religion in Nigeria have come under intense scrutiny.

### V. BACKGROUND OF STUDY

Boko Haram, which was largely unknown when it emerged in 2002 in Maiduguri, a remote city in northeastern Nigeria, Borno state has a border with Cameroon Chad and Niger surged to preeminence in 2009 through a remarkable but deadly chain of events that occurred in Maiduguri. They moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe state bordered with Niger, to set up a separatist community with hardline Islamic principles. (Alozieuwa 2012). They affected Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, and some parts of Gombe and Plateau states. The Boko Haram sect was widely known to have mobilized its membership from women and children, school drop-outs, and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates, most of whom tore up their certificates; student members withdrew from school (Okereke, 2012: 450). In terms of its modus operandi, observers said that the group constructed a "state within a state," with a cabinet, its religious police, and a large farm, and attracted more and more people under its roof by offering welfare handouts, food, and shelter. Many of the people the group attracted were refugees from the wars over the border in Chad and jobless Nigerian youths.

Since then, Boko Haram has either claimed responsibility for or has been credited with most terror activities in the northern part of the country. Its operations have also grown in scale and sophistication (Alozieuwa, 2012).

The funding of the group cannot be categorically stated. According to Members of the Borno religious establishment, the Late Yusuf received funds from Salafist contacts in Saudi Arabia following two hajj trips made by Yusuf during the period. Other possible sources of funding are donations from wealthy northern Nigerians. The group also robbed banks, cash-in-transit convoys, and successful businesses, not only in Maiduguri but also in Bauchi, where the group remains strong. The group claims it is permitted to do this by the Quran, as the money it takes is considered to be the "spoils of war." The group is thought to have made approximately 500 million naira (about \$3 million, or £2 million) from such

robberies, but such claims are unverifiable (Walker, 2012).

**Approaches to Combat Internal Security in Nigeria** The international community began to emphasize security matters about development issues during the early 1990s. A consensus was reached on the need to broaden and deepen the concept of security, taking account of the political context at the end of the Cold War.

#### **Government Responses to Insecurity and Conflict in Nigeria**

There are various strategic and operational mechanisms that the government may adopt in addressing issues of insecurity and conflict in the country. One of the foremost strategies of government in response to insecurity and conflict is the use of government intervention agencies established under the law. Some of the agencies created to respond to cases of insecurity and conflict in the country include the National Orientation Agency (NOA); the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA); and other government agencies. The deployment of force to contain incidences of insecurity and conflict by use of the Military Tasks Force. In some instances, a state of emergency was declared as it was in the case of Plateau state and even in some fifteen local government areas of Borno, Plateau, and Yobe states in 2011 (JTF) aid quell violence and maintained peace in troubled zones in Nigeria. The establishment of panels or commissions of inquiry that act as Ad Hoc measures to mitigate tensions and restore peace in troubled areas (Chinwokwu, 2013:7). The government has also responded to conflict and insecurity through dialogue or the use of mediators.

#### **Summary of Major Findings**

1. Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes politics in northern Nigeria has been hijacked by a group of corrupt and false Muslims; and also, that westernization has bred corruption in the Nigerian polity and therefore wants to wage war against westernization of all sorts of the country by creating a menace in the country.
2. The core value of a modern nation is the defense of its national security and its territorial integrity.
3. Threats to life and properties have become accentuated with ethno-religious conflicts, political and ethnic militancy, smuggling, and bunkering of resources among others that continue to threaten Nigeria's national security

and the Boko haram menace is part of the national threat of Nigeria national security.

4. Finally, there is a need for re-structuring the security concerns of Nigeria which Nigeria security should be concerned with food security, economic security, domestic order, educational growth, old age security, national disaster security, job security, environmental security, and comprehensive human development and general constructive integration.

#### **VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

The study looked at violent extremism and radicalization in north Nigeria. "A case study of Boko Haram insurgency" It is relevant to note that a significant number of our findings agreed with concepts reviewed in North East Nigeria, Boko Haram-related terrorism and insurgency are pressing and potentially growing threats that could well develop even stronger international links. The violence in the six states across the North East risks creating even further religious and ethnic tension in other states across Nigeria Taking a wider perspective, the unrest in Mali and the more recent crises in the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan, together with the ongoing violence in Northern Nigeria, all have implications for the broader sub-Saharan region. Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Niger, and Cameroon, all of which are among the countries affected by the larger patterns of conflict and insecurity.

A broader, human security and governance-centered agenda and associated development are essential for national and regional stability. Further study and greater attention should thus be devoted to how these challenges have been handled throughout the country.

While this report in general presents a negative picture of Nigeria, its aim was limited to presenting the challenges. Through highlighting positive and successful examples of approaching and dealing with these challenges, experience could be gained and lessons learned, but this was regrettably outside the scope of the present report. This role is further accentuated by the centrality of Nigeria to tackle the challenge of Boko Haram. The ability of Nigeria to manage its security threats will thus greatly impact the entire region and set the conditions for more effective regional measures.

The government should embark on mass employment of youth so that they will no longer be ready tools in the hands of desperate politicians or

religious zealots. There should be a re-orientation of the military and further training to meet the recent challenges of today's sophisticated global threat. Tougher anti-terrorism laws are required. Legal punishments for terrorists, their active or logistic supporters, and corrupt officials who enable the smuggling of arms and explosives into the Country. The prosecution of the perpetrators of terrorist acts needs to be quick and fast. s

### REFERENCES

- [1]. Alozieuwa, S.H.O (2012): Contending Theories on Nigeria's Security Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram Insurgency. The Peace and Conflict Review. Volume 7, Issue 1 - ISSN: 1659-3995.
- [2]. Amnesty International (2012): Trapped in the cycle of violence 44.043.2012 <http://www.amnesty.ca/default>files>.
- [3]. Barkun, Michael (2003): A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 3-4.
- [4]. Carter, B. (2013): Women and violent extremism, GSDRC. <http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/hdq898.pdf> Accessed on 2 November 2016.
- [5]. Chiemelie Ezeobi, (2018): Nigeria: Countering Violent Extremism, June 13, 2018. P5.
- [6]. Chinwokwu Eke C (2013): The Challenges of Conflict Management in a Democratic Society: An Overview of Insecurity in Nigeria American International Journal of Social Science Vol. 2 No. 3; May 201393
- [7]. Crenshaw, M. (2000): The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. Political Psychology, 21, 405-420.
- [8]. Crenshaw, Martha, (1992): How terrorists think: What psychology can contribute to understanding terrorism? In L. Howard (Ed.), Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses. New York: Praeger
- [9]. Dada, J. A. and Ibanga, M. E. (2011): "Human rights Protection in Nigeria: From Rhetoric to pragmatic Agenda". African Journal of Law and Criminology, Vol 1 No 2 P70-81.
- [10]. Dubawa, (2018): Why violent extremism is on the rise in West African countries, Premium Times. June 27, P4.
- [11]. Hoffman, Bruce (1998/1999): Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press 12(6).
- [12]. Hoffmann, (2002:41): Terrorism and political violence. Vol..27, No.3(Winter 2002/2003), pp.41.40Laqueur, No End to war, op.cit., pp.9.41Hoffmann...
- [13]. Human Rights Watch, 2012: Attacks by the militant Islamist group Boko Haram and abuses by Government.<http://www.hrw.org>country-chapters>.
- [14]. Martha Crenshaw and Gary LaFree, (2016): Countering Terrorism (Brookings Institution Press, p56-67.
- [15]. Martha Crenshaw, (2017): Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Risk Factors, Causes and Threat Assessment, University of California Press, Santa Barbra.
- [16]. McCauley, C., Mosalenko, S. (2008): "Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways towards terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence p.416.
- [17]. Okereke, (2012): Contending theories on Nigeria's Security Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram insurgency- Peace and Conflict Review.
- [18]. Orsini (2013): The Salafi Jihad as religious ideology, Terrorism Centre as West Point.
- [19]. Popper, Karl (1945): Open Society and Its Enemies, Book II. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- [20]. PUNCH NEWSPAPER:2015): <https://punchng.com>, Bokoharam-attack.
- [21]. Sahara Reporter, April 21, 2014.
- [22]. Salawu B. (2010): Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies, European Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 13, NO. 3, 345-353.
- [23]. Tell Newspaper (2013: Insurgency in northeastern Nigeria.<http://tell.ng>
- [24]. Walker, A. (2012): 'What is Boko Haram?'. United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 30, June 2012.