African Union and Conflict Management In South Sudan

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Abstract

Upon attaining independence, one of the main issues that African states had to deal with was how to maintain peace such that the new states that they were can begin to develop. This study examined the conflict management mechanism of the African Union and how this architecture has been deployed to effectively prevent and or manage conflicts on the continent. The study adopted qualitative research method, implying that the study is based on the use of secondary data. The study thus found that the African Union's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had a significant impact on the violence in South Sudan. The study also discovered that reducing violence in South Sudan was made easier by using an early warning system and a panel of wise people. The African standby force, the Early Warning System, and the Peace and Security Commission are just a few of the components of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture that the report suggests should be strengthened and revitalized in order to give it a renewed capacity to perform.
Key Words: Conflict, Management, South Sudan, African Union.

I.   Introduction

The African continent has faced numerous challenges since the start of the post-colonial era. These challenges are the result of the rise of problems like state-to-state colonial frontiers, the growth of terrorist, rebel, and insurgent groups, poor leadership, and stalled social, economic, and political progress. These issues directly impact the African people, particularly when it comes to a comprehensive understanding of security. Consequently, competition and the urge to survive have sometimes resulted in violent clashes, which have been an increasing worry for continental authorities and the global community. In an effort to address African issues head-on, measures have been adopted with the intention of readily integrating them into the continent's social, cultural, political, and economic norms. When several African nations attained independence, they engaged in bloody wars with one another. Numerous conflicts have been fought since then, both inside and between states. Collier et al. (2008) found that by 1992, approximately 47% of all civil conflicts globally were fought in Africa. Fifteen of the high-risk UNDHA events in the twentieth and twenty-first century may have started in Africa, according to Umozurike (2005; Efebeh, 2016). Rwanda, Sudan, Zaire, Lesotho, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Somalia are among the nations where conflict has broken out. Indeed, the management of violence and peace building was a fundamental problem for newly independent African republics. African states have attempted to improve their competence in numerous areas of socioeconomic, political, and security life, but there are still holes in the region's institutional framework for managing conflict despite these efforts (Garuba, 1998).

Many people's perception of Africa is that it is characterized by quasi-Hobbesian anarchy rather than elaborate forms of security cooperation based on a communality of values. This is due in large part to the prevalence of violent conflicts and humanitarian catastrophes in large parts of the continent, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Somalia (Franke, 2011; Efebeh, 2017). African states have made significant progress in institutionalizing conflict management and such collaboration during the past few years.

The conflicts and wars in Africa took on new dimensions during the cold war. Many more people on the continent are dying from intrastate conflicts than from wars between nations. A prime example of this is the Rwandan genocide, which resulted in the deaths of millions of innocent people (Shelton, 1997). African leaders are considering some of the guiding principles, structures, systems, and policies on conflict management after realizing the change in conflict dimension in Africa and its attendant repercussions and the decreased concern exhibited by the

international world. As a result, we had to take a hard look at the importance of not interfering with other countries' internal affairs and respecting their sovereignty. Organization of African Unity (OAU) was renamed the African Union to kick off the process (AU). With the establishment of the African Union, non-interference became secondary to non-indifference in the pursuit of peace, stability, and security on the continent (Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act, 2001). South Sudan, like many other newly independent African countries, has struggled since achieving independence. Due to political bickering and ideological differences among local authorities, many residents are compelled to seek safety in the ethnic enclaves of their own groups in order to further their cause (Cheeseman 2015; Efebeh, 2018). Such a community restructuring draws inspiration from the past but is driven by pressing present-day issues.

The conflict in South Sudan has been going on even before the country's recent declaration of independence. Various interests, including those from external powers like the United States, China, and Russia, had been engaged in heated conflicts for control of the country's immense resource endowments, which had been at the heart of the crises. Peace and stability in South Sudan should be of paramount importance to all of the important participants in the nascent nation despite the divergent interests of the external powers. In the midst of ongoing wars and conflicts, no party can successfully pursue its strategic interests in the country. Numerous countries, including the United States, Russia, China, and even certain IGAD members, have an interest in South Sudan. These outside powers have become deeply entwined in South Sudanese politics, and they view one another with suspicion as they pursue their own, often competing, interests in the country and the region.

As a result of this interplay, it is abundantly evident that the AU's peace measures in South Sudan will neither work nor last until the interests of these main external powers are reconciled. Madut (2015) rightly points out that South Sudan needs strategies and efforts to deal with the competing interests of the three major countries and make the most of its oil, mineral wealth, and political capital. They have a vested interest in seeing the nascent nation stable and be well-governed. This common ground between the opposing countries means they have an incentive to work together to bring peace and prosperity back to Africa's newest nation. Against this context, the current study intends to analyze the African Union's (AU) peace architecture and conflict management in South Sudan from 2011 to 2020.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study adopts structural conflict theory by Galtung (1969) as the theoretical framework.

The theory was developed by Galtung in the late 1960s that conflicts might lead to violence, and that conflicts can both have direct and structural causes (Galtung, 1969). Galtung put up a significant model of conflict that includes both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. In his model, the three points of a conflict triangle are a person's contradictory beliefs, values, and actions (Galtung, 1969:72). (Check out the illustration in Figure 1). Here, "incompatibility of goals" between contending parties stems from a "mis- fit between societal values and social structure," and this is what we mean by "contradiction." The parties, their interests, and the conflict between those interests are what make a symmetric conflict so contentious (Mitchell, 1981).


Contradiction   Structural Violence   Peace Building

Attitude-BehaviorCultural   Violence-Direct Violence   Peace-Making-Peace-Keeping

Figure 1: Galtung's Models of Conflict, Violence and Peace
Source: Galtung (1969)

The parties, the nature of their relationship, and any inherent conflicts of interest characterize an asymmetric conflict. The attitude of the parties involved incorporates their estimations of, and exaggerations about, one another and themselves. As with any human interaction, these can be influenced by positive or negative emotions, such as fear, wrath, resentment, and hatred.

However, in violent disputes, each side is more likely to form derogatory stereotypes of the other. Included in one's attitude are their feelings, thoughts, and actions. An expressive view of conflict origins holds that "a social conflict emerges when two or more parties perceive they have incompatible purposes," which places an emphasis on the subjective experiences of the people involved (Kriesberg, 1982).

The third part is how people act. Collaboration or coercion, friendly or hostile overtures: these are all possible outcomes. Behaviors such as threats, coercion, and destructive attacks are hallmarks of violent conflict. An instrumental view of conflict is held by analysts who place a premium on external factors like structural relationships and competing material interests or behaviors (for example, "conflict occurs whenever incompatible actions occur" because " When one activity is incompatible with another, it hinders, disrupts, interferes with, damages, or otherwise reduces the efficacy of the latter.", (Deutsch, 1973). According to Galtung (1969), these three factors must coexist for there to be a true conflict. Without conflict-related mindsets and actions, a conflict structure is merely structural. In conflict, according to Galtung (1969), structure, attitudes, and behavior are all in a permanent state of flux and mutually influence one another. When the interests of the people involved diverge or when the nature of their connection becomes oppressive, the resulting dynamic can be described as a conflict formation. After settling on this framework, the various interested parties formed an organization to further their goals. Conflict and hostility become habits for them. As a result, the potential for confrontation increases. As it does so, it has the potential to enlarge, bringing in new players, as well as to deepen and spread, spawning new conflicts among the original players and even further drawing in new participants. This makes it harder to tackle the novel aspects of the conflict. However, in order to end the conflict, a number of dynamic shifts must take place, including a de-escalation of conflict behavior, a shift in perspective, and a revision of the connections or competing interests at the conflict's center.

Application of the theory

The ABC model is a proposed theoretical and practical framework for analyzing the processes and aims of conflict transformation and peace-building in a unified and coherent way. This model is proposed as an alternate policy framework and suggested method for dealing with South Sudan's problems. This is because its execution will allow for greater focus on solving South Sudan's development problems, which in turn will help bring about lasting peace. The Africa Union (AU) Commission of Inquiry on Southern Sudan conducted an investigation into the causes of the conflict and proposed solutions based on the findings of their dialogue with the warring parties to determine the Attitude, Behaviour, and Contradictions that led to the 2015 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that later collapsed. In order to map out, manage, and ultimately resolve conflicts, it is necessary to first understand what causes them, how the parties involved feel about it, what the nature of the dispute is, and what internal contradictions exist.

Structural Conflict Theory is useful because it can explain disputes and the actions of state actors during conflict management, despite its numerous detractors. In addition, paradoxes, cultural behaviors, and attitude differences were also cited by Galtung (2016) as causes of conflict and violence. The South Sudan crisis is rooted in all of these issues.

Causes of Conflicts in Africa

Conflicts in Africa stems primarily from crises of national governance and the failure of governmental institutions in African countries to mediate conflicts. Thus, colonialism may be the root of many conflicts in Africa must be taken into consideration in the attempts to address the enduring African conflicts, (Obasanjo (1991; Anyang' Nyong'o,1991; Msabaha (1991; Efebeh, 2020a; Efebeh, 2020b). They further stressed that conflicts at sub-national and national levels in Africa are multifaceted, and that imposing peacekeeping forces is merely imposing new political and economic institutions on the various African conflicts. Similarly, Okoyo (1977), Duala-M'Bedy (1984), Ake (1985) and Cohen (1996), Efebeh, 2020; considered the various conflicts in Africa as a natural consequence of Africa's colonial past. Okoyo (1977:93) for example, posited that political instability is rooted in the very structure of society from colonial past and for most new countries in Africa. Cohen (1995) succinctly argued that the sources and consequences of Africa's internal conflicts have their root in colonialism, the subsequent processes of decolonization and state formation, and the ensuing crisis of nation building. For Cohen(1995) colonial state was fraught with contradictions out of ethnic and regional diversities, and rendered antagonism by gross inequities in power relations; and in the uneven distribution of national wealth and development opportunities

The decolonization processes in many countries has caused the contradictions on to the independent states through a flawed process. He argued that persistent conflicts and bad governance in Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi can be traced back to the hasty and unprepared granting of independence by Belgium in 1960. The major wars in Angola and Mozambique aroused out of panic de-colonization from a revolutionary and chaotic Portugal in 1974-75. Similarly, Sudan conflicts is traced to the manner in which the Anglo-Egyptian administration brought the North and the South together, but kept them apart under a separatist policy for most of the Condominium rule; and then left them in a centralized unitary state without constitutional guarantees for the disadvantaged South (Cohen 1995:12).

However, it is imperative to stress that, like the afore-mentioned conflict cases, the roots of many current conflicts – latent and manifest – including the cases of Western Sahara and British Southern Cameroons could also be traced to colonialism and the de-colonization process. The need for a colonial analysis remains pertinent because the workings of colonialism's culture are still with us and because post-colonialism is highly engaged with colonialism (Thomas 1994).

From the foregoing arguments, this study stressed the causes and consequences of the conflicts in Africa from the shackles of colonialism, the processes of decolonization and state formation, and the ensuing crisis of nation-building, then any attempt to resolve the conflicts must also transcend the concepts of new institutions which will amplify participation, legitimacy, redistribution of resources and good governance steps to also address other root causes of the problems. Any discussion of 'internal or national governance' therefore cannot exclude the structure of the state and the political leadership as inherited from colonialism, given that the basis for African states and political leadership in most of the continent is colonial.

A close examination of the various conflicts occurring in Africa reveals two broad categories, namely intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Each of these two broad categories can be broken down further into what has been referred to as 'relatively abstract dimensions of conflict' (Kriesberg 1982; Burton 1990; Efebeh & Okereka, 2020). These dimensions, in Kriesberg's words, include the issues in contention (resources and interests or values and ideology), the arenas in which the conflict is waged (families, communities, countries, or regions) and the contending parties (persons, organizations, classes, or people). In the

light of these dimensions, we can consider African conflicts as belonging to the following six types: interethnic conflicts, inter-state conflicts, liberation conflicts, civil rights conflicts, annexationist conflicts, and political transition conflicts. Opposing tribal or ethnic groups are mainly found within national boundaries although the inherent problems of artificial borders caused by colonialism have resulted in some ethnic groups being found in two, three or even more African countries. These conflicts are very recurrent although with less gravity in terms of the numbers of casualties, refugees and displaced persons, and the spread of disease, famine and environmental devastation. The examples of clan fighting in Somalia and Liberia where the control of power at the centre was one of the main issues at the high point of inter-ethnic conflicts, but these are only the exception and not the rule – given that inter-ethnic conflicts occur over any number of issues ranging from politics to socio-economic issues such as religion, culture or land and other scarce resources. Inter-ethnic or inter-tribal conflicts abound in many countries of Africa. In post-colonial Africa, these conflicts are greatly exacerbated by the neo-colonial arrangements that characterize many African governments. In many African countries where leadership remains in the same hands and continues to serve colonial interests, state apparatus are known to sponsor some inter-ethnic conflicts as a divide-and-rule strategy.

The South Sudan Conflicts

South Sudan became the youngest nation in the world after splitting from the larger Sudan to become the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. However, their independence, like that of other countries in the world came with a huge human cost, following decades of intense conflicts between the Arab North and the non-Arab south. The main focus was on the conflict between the North and the South and not the 'frozen' and 'cold' relations among the different ethnicities in the South. The referendum was overwhelmingly in favor of separation; with 99% of the votes cast approving the decision. For the North, however, this marked a major downgrade of their country's land mass as one-third of the land and about three-quarters of its oil reserves went to the new Republic of South Sudan (Ottaway& El-Sadany, 2012:3).

The conflict continued with heavy casualties witnessed until 2015, when a temporary peace treaty was signed (Blackings, 2016:7). Cessation of hostilities did not last long as both sides accused each other of violating the terms of

the peace treaty. Episodic violence kept erupting as the country remained unstable. Even the Southern parts that were relatively peaceful and known for their high crop yields came under attack. This affected food production in the country and diminished supply quantities. Several factors spur the prolonged and persistent Sudanese civil war with scourge on properties and lives. Predominantly, ineffective and biased diplomatic interventions by inter-governmental bodies at the international, regional and sub-regional levels such like the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) was deficient its structural and institutional capacity to manage African conflicts. There are divergent views of scholars on the South Sudan Crisis. For instance, Brieidlid and Arensen, (2014) argued that the linkage between conflicts and militarization is an established process in South Sudan conflict. Lunn (2016) observed that the crisis in South Sudan is associated with the inability of relevant institution to manage and mediate conflict which spills out into the army, and subsequently the general population. Additionally, South Sudan beyond the political conflict, the country encounters a challenge of weakness or absence of institutions; and lack of institutional capacity within the state appears to be a case in point. The establishment of institutions is influenced by ethnic aggregation and personality cults (De Waal, 2014). Radon and Logan (2014) stressed lack of inclusiveness as the cause of the crisis in Southern Sudan by government is significant to the realization of democracy and peace dividends in states emerging from conflict. However in South Sudan, the exercise of inclusivity has been marred with contradictions between constitutional provision and existence practices (Radon & Logan, 2014; Efebeh, 2021).

Political parties in South Sudan are found to be the foci for rewarding the warlords dubbed as freedom fighters at the expense of participatory civilian structures, the nerves of ethnic factionalism over nationalism, exercise of centralized nomination system, all of which breed tensions among the citizenry. Moreover, the militarization of public service, perception of ethnic favoritism in public employment and appointments, marginalization of regions outside urban centers and unequal share of national resources comprise practices that violate the foundations of inclusive governance and push the country to the margin of conflict (De Waal, 2014).

The awareness of this structural and institutional defects inspired founding Member States of the African Union (AU) in 2002 to establish the Peace and Security Council (PSC) that will facilitate and fast-track the resolution of the protracted Sudan conflicts. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union entered into force on 26 December 2003, after being ratified by the required majority of Member States of the AU. Because of its devastating nature, international attention was focused on the situation, and a series of mediation and negotiation processes between the North and the South were initiated. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005, was the culmination of a series of agreements and protocols agreed between 2002 and 2004 (Jok, 2015). Mistrust between non-Arab southern populations and the government persisted during the separation process because several crucial issues were not addressed. The African Union was fast to intervene and try to find a permanent solution to the crisis in southern Sudan. The African organization moved quickly to bring the warring parties to negotiations and launch the peace process and the African Union Commission of Inquiry on Southern Sudan with the assistance of IGAD (AUCISS). The AU's mission was accomplished in this country. There have been setbacks along the way, though. For instance, the momentum of this intervention was impacted by the delay in the publishing of the AUCISS report. Some of the suggestions made in the AUCISS report have yet to be realized, and ineffective coordination among the initiatives further slowed down the peace process.

The conflict has been persistent despite the failure of the 2015 peace deal that was brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Knopf, 2016:12). (Knopf, 2016:12). During this time, there have been multiple failed attempts to bring the leaders back to the bargaining table. The peace discussions that had been suspended in April 2018 restarted in Addis Abeba at the beginning of May, but they broke out at the end of the month without having reached any concrete agreements. The IGAD proposal on the distribution of government jobs, the structure of government, and most crucially, the security arrangements, was rejected by both sides.

On June 25, 2018, after two years of pressure, President SalvaKiir and RiekMachar met in Khartoum (The Star, 2018). A new peace accord, mandating a nationwide ceasefire and the exchange of government positions, was signed as the meeting's culmination. Both sides blame one other for breaking the truce, which was broken in the country's northern region. Analysts are skeptical that the recently negotiated deal will hold longer in light of the virtually immediate violation, given that earlier agreements have not been honored.

Considering that elections were meant to take place in 2015 but did not, efforts are on to extend the presidential term again by three years, and this poses a threat to the current accord. The oppositions continue to voice concerns about the accord, including its provision for the resumption of oil exploration. A general election and the evacuation of troops from metropolitan areas, villages, schools, camps, and churches will follow a 120-day pre-transition period and a 36-month transition period outlined in the agreement package. Notably, besides the two main protagonists, additional groups have made their way into the negotiations and will be represented in both the executive and parliamentary branches. Since they were present in Kampala, Uganda on July 8th, 2018 for the signing of an agreement, they have been considered for one of the four vice-presidential posts being considered. Although this peace accord is a step in the right direction, it fails to address the underlying issues that led to the failure of past deals.

Conflict Management

According to Best (2005), cited in Idris (2018), conflict management encompasses all aspects of constructively dealing with conflict at various phases, including conflict limitation, containment, and litigation. According to the ideas presented by Otite in Obi (2007), "Conflict Management" is more of a permanent structure that includes institutionalized provisions and regulative procedures for handling conflicts whenever they arise. When possible, conflict should be avoided through the use of conflict management strategies, and when it cannot be avoided, conflicts should be managed in order to achieve a speedy resolution. Although conflict is inevitable in any business, it can be mitigated through conflict management strategies like collective bargaining, mediated discussions, and mediation (Idris, 2018; Efebeh, 2021).

When destructive conduct and hostile attitude have been eliminated, the next step in the process is conflict management, which is a process-oriented activity focused at resolving the underlying reasons of misunderstanding and/or violence. If conflict is to be addressed in any context, according to Umar (2003), certain processes must be put into place. The use of force, disengagement, migration, third-party intervention, and other methods like collaboration and negotiation are all examples. According to Mitchel and Banks (1996), "conflict management" refers to "an outcome in which the issues in an existing conflict are satisfactorily dealt with through an approach or solution that is mutually accepted by both parties; self-sustaining in the long run; and productive of a new positive relationship between parties." It can also refer to the steps taken to reach a desired result. The term "conflict resolution" can also refer to a variety of strategies for reducing or removing triggers for conflict. Based on this concept, it's obvious that if you want to put an end to conflict, you should aim your fire at its origin rather than at its consequences. Thus, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, diplomacy, arbitration, and litigation are all broad processes within the context of conflict management:

However, the aforementioned categorization falls short because it fails to explain the criteria that were taken into account to arrive at that conclusion. However, the work is essential in that it helped people realize that there are several approaches to settling disputes. By facilitating communication between warring parties, conflict resolution has the potential to lessen the conflict's intensity, duration, and negative impacts (Yinusa & Adeoye, 2005; Efebeh & Uwuseba, 2023). With the goal of altering the root causes and escalating conditions of conflict, Conflict Management employs a wide range of techniques (including, but not limited to, facilitation, mediation, counseling and therapy, organizational development, conciliation, and the use of quasi-political and criminal and civil justice systems) (Otite,1999).

According to Burton (1993), resolving conflicts and settling disputes are two sides of the same coin. By "settlement," Burton means the negotiation or arbitration of disputes, while "resolution" refers to the results of a conflict based on the same principles. They all work on the same principles, though, and can be used interchangeably. However, according to Mitchel (1993), conflict resolution is an action that aims to either make the source of conflict easier to manage or change. According to the reasoning above, there must be a third party involved in both ideas.

According to McNamara (2010), there is no optimal approach to resolving disagreements. It really is a case-by-case basis. Possible approaches include: accommodation, pretense, compromise, competition, and collaboration. As other people have reasoned along similar lines, this is not a new argument. However, the result is highly significant since it bolsters the concept that conflict management is not a straightjacket; rather, the appropriate technique to adopt depends on the situation at hand.

African Union (AU) and Conflict Management

The African Union (AU) was formed, as stated by Brian-Vincent and Dauda (2011:72), to address the issue of conflicts on the African continent. To promote peace, security, and stability as a precondition for the implementation of a development and integration agenda, African leaders adopted the AU Act in 2000, acutely aware of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socioeconomic development of the continent (Brian-Vincent & Dauda, 2011; Efebeh, 2018). As a result, the Act identifies as some of its goals the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent and the creation of the conditions that would allow Africa to assume the leadership position it deserves in the world economy and in international discussions (Brian-Vincent &Dauda,2011:72). Principles such as the prohibition of the use of force or threat of use of force among member states of the union, peaceful co-existence of member states, and their right to live in peace and security, and the right of member stat (Brian-Vincent and Dauda,2011:7).

AU/IGAD's Peace Process in South Sudan

It took nearly two years for peace talks in South Sudan to reach an agreement. In any case, the impact will be extremely small. There have been multiple participants in the mediation process. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is often cited as the most prominent of these organizations working to end the civil war in the country. There were special envoys from the three major regional powers of IGAD who spearheaded the peace talks that were mediated by IGAD. Three examples are Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. Despite IGAD's best efforts, the warring parties still refuse to settle their differences.

When it comes to mediating disputes, IGAD members themselves have been accused of being biased due to rivalries and long-standing regional divisions. IGAD has expanded its mediation process into the "IGAD-PLUS" program, which includes the African Union, the United Nations, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Norway, and the IGAD Partners Forum, in order to address these limitations (IPF). Within such a short time frame, the "IGAD-PLUS" program sought to offer a worldwide veneer behind IGAD in order to resolve the war that badly destroys the country. However, it is not working as intended because the parties involved in the processes are frustrated with both the IGAD and the targeted country. Despite IGAD's problems, the organization deserves credit for the steps it has already taken to resolve the crisis.

The construction of a temporary unity administration was at the forefront of the fourth round of peace talks, which took place on June 9, 2014. Due to the opposing viewpoints of the involved parties, however, it was not a simple process. The question of what kind of government should be established served as the jumping off point. On July 20, 2014, the fifth round of peace talks was held to resolve the rebel parties' issue (Unfair inclusion of IGAD in the selection of stakeholders' process). It was unsuccessful, however, because the opposition parties refused to participate in the negotiations. As a result, the mediators and the world community, who all want to see the parties to the conflict reach a lasting peace agreement, were left feeling very disappointed.

The sixth round of peace talks, held on November 10th, 2014, was the final round of talks for 2014. There was high hope for this round to bear fruit because of the parties' mutual commitment to the cease-fire agreement and other papers, such as the implementation matrix, negotiated during the previous round. IGAD's warnings to the warring parties this time around to adhere to the COH agreement and work on the power-sharing pact seemed genuine. Meanwhile, intense fighting between rebels and government troops helped seal the peace deal. The government of South Sudan and the rebels started peace talks in bold fashion in February and March of 2015, with the help of the Horn of Africa bloc IGAD.

In spite of signing a fresh ceasefire on February 1st, 2015, President Kir and Dr. Machar were given the green light to continue discussing contentious matters including power sharing and the formation of a transitional administration. A month later, on March 5, 2015, what was supposed to be the final peace pact between the administration of the country and the SPLM (IO) collapsed without an agreement. The breakdown in communication made the conflict worse. According to the IGAD report from March 2015, after the peace pact was broken, civilians were killed, women and children were tortured, and key infrastructure in the Upper Nile and Unity states was destroyed. After the failure of the aforementioned IGAD-led peace negotiations, the organization announced a new peace negotiating method on March 12th, 2015, which it dubbed the IGAD-PLUS formula. The original schedule called for the formula's introduction in April. While it was fully implemented on August 17, 2015, its success can be attributed to the lack of commitment and

political will from the warring parties. Accordingly, in the following parts, we will briefly explore the key considerations and difficulties inherent in the Peace agreement reached on August 17 and 26.

Peace talks between the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) were held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on August 17, 2015, and a historic agreement was reached. The proposal covered all bases and accounted for everything. First and foremost, it mandates a lasting truce between the warring sides within 72 hours after the signature of the pact. Second, the peace plan has given militants 30 days to gather and form a canton. In addition, it demanded that all Kampala's troops leave the nation within 45 days and that all foreign militia forces disband and return home. As part of the peace agreement, Dr. Machar will presumably regain his vice presidential post.

At the agreed upon time, only SPLM/IO commander Riek Machar and Pagan Amum signed on behalf of the Ex-Political Detainees. President Salva Kiir is hesitant to sign the agreement and has asked for an extra 15 days to make sure of his decision. As of the 26th of August 2015, he signed the agreement with the rebel groups, albeit with significant concerns. Seven or more ceasefires have been agreed upon by the warring parties, but as has been stated, each one has been broken within days or even hours. This may prompt us to wonder why the peace agreements suggested by IGAD and IGAD-PLUS failed to bring about lasting peace. This is evident on both sides, in the vagueness of the IGAD's and IGAD-proposed PLUS's peace agreements and in the unwillingness and resistance of the warring parties to adhere to them.

In Brian Adeba's (2015) opinion, the IGAD peace proposal has some serious flaws. He defended the plan on the basis of three IGAD-supplied points. Among these are questions of inclusiveness, power distribution, and the why and wherefore of the transitional administration. The distribution of power is one of the contentious topics that threaten to derail the peace agreement. According to IGAD's proposal from July 2015, the government, the SPLM-IO, the SPLM-FD, and other political parties would hold 53%, 33%, and 14% of national authority, respectively. The SPLMIO has given their full approval of the agreement. In spite of this, Kiir's demand could be restrained by government concerns about accepting the quota (70 percent).

Causes of Prolonged Conflict

Ethnic and Tribal Tensions: South Sudan is home to a diverse array of ethnic groups, with the two largest being the Dinka and Nuer. These groups have historically vied for political power, land, and resources, leading to intense ethnic and tribal rivalries. Political elites have exploited these divisions to consolidate power, perpetuating conflict (Human Rights Watch2021; Efebeh, 2022).

Weak Governance and Corruption: The new government of South Sudan faced significant challenges in establishing a functional state apparatus. Weak governance, coupled with rampant corruption, has hindered the development of essential infrastructure, social services, and the equitable distribution of resources, fueling discontent among the population,(Young, 2015).

Economic Issues: South Sudan is rich in oil resources, which account for a significant portion of its economy. However, disputes over oil revenue sharing, mismanagement, and fluctuations in global oil prices have been a source of tension both internally and with neighboring Sudan.

Competition for Political Power: Competition for political power and control over the state apparatus has been a driving force behind the conflict. Various political leaders and factions have engaged in power struggles, often using military means to achieve their objectives,(Young, 2015).

Regional and International Factors: South Sudan's prolonged conflict has been exacerbated by the involvement of neighboring countries, which have supported different factions, and international actors who have attempted to mediate and influence the peace process(Young, 2015).

Human Rights Abuses: The conflict has been marked by severe human rights abuses, including widespread violence against civilians, sexual violence, and recruitment of child soldiers. These atrocities have contributed to a cycle of revenge and retaliation.

Prolonged conflict in South Sudan is deeply rooted in a complex web of historical, ethnic, political, and economic factors. The legacy of colonialism and the impact of past civil wars, coupled with contemporary challenges related to governance and resource management, continue to contribute to the ongoing conflict. Addressing these underlying causes and promoting sustainable peace and reconciliation in South Sudan remains a critical international and regional priority. There is also the colonial power's divide and rule policy angle to the crises. It is this colonial policy that has led to the various crises in post-colonial Africa.

The effectiveness of the conflict management used by African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in conflict management

The African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are key regional organizations involved in conflict management in Africa. Their effectiveness can be assessed based on their roles, accomplishments, and limitations in dealing with conflicts across the continent (African Union, n.d).

The AU, through its Peace and Security Council (PSC), is entrusted with the responsibility of addressing conflict and maintaining peace in Africa. It deploys peacekeeping missions and conducts conflict mediation and resolution efforts.

Mediation and Peacekeeping: The AU has successfully mediated conflicts in several African regions, including the peace agreement in South Sudan in 2018. Its peacekeeping missions, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), have contributed to stabilizing conflict zones.

Capacity Building: The AU has actively engaged in capacity building, training peacekeepers, and supporting conflict prevention initiatives. This has led to improvements in the readiness and effectiveness of African peacekeeping forces.

The AU faces resource constraints, making it heavily dependent on external funding, which can undermine its autonomy and effectiveness. Additionally, it has encountered difficulties in enforcing peace agreements and navigating divisions among member states, which can affect its cohesion and effectiveness (Maasho, 2018).

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) primarily focuses on the Horn of Africa and its surrounding areas, mediating conflicts and promoting regional cooperation among its member states.

IGAD has been effective in mediating conflicts, notably playing a central role in the peace agreement in South Sudan in 2018. However, the South Sudan peace process has faced challenges, highlighting the complexity of conflict resolution in the region.

IGAD has facilitated regional cooperation and dialogue, providing a platform for member states to address common challenges and seek collective solutions. This cooperative approach has contributed to the organization's effectiveness.

The challenges faced the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in managing the conflicts

The African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) play significant roles in managing conflicts in Africa. While they have achieved notable successes, they face a range of challenges in their conflict management efforts.

Resource Constraints: A significant challenge facing the AU is its dependence on external funding for peacekeeping operations and conflict management initiatives. Inadequate resources can hamper the AU's ability to respond promptly and independently to conflicts (African Union. 2021).

Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms: The AU often faces difficulties in enforcing peace agreements and ensuring compliance by warring parties. The lack of effective mechanisms for sanctions and enforcement can undermine the implementation of peace agreements (Boulden, & Mulamula, 2014). Divisions among Member States: The AU's effectiveness can be hindered by divisions among its member states, particularly when different states have conflicting interests in a given conflict. This can impede a Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)like the AU, faces resource limitations. Its capacity to respond to conflicts is constrained by financial and logistical challenges, which can affect the scope and scale of its conflict management efforts (Tadesse, & Adebajo, 2015). Complexity of Conflicts: The Horn of Africa, where IGAD is particularly active, is riddled with complex and protracted conflicts. Mediating and resolving these multifaceted conflicts requires patience, perseverance, and the ability to navigate intricate political landscapes (Söderbaum, 2004). Differing Member State Interests: IGAD's effectiveness in managing conflicts can be compromised when member states have varying interests in a particular conflict; balancing these competing interests while maintaining a united front can be a significant challenge (Irandoust, 2006).

Lack of Adequate Finance: The inadequacy of financial resources and logistical assistance presents a significant barrier to the successful execution of cooperation between the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the domain of peace and security. The lack of sufficient measures hinders the ability to effectively intervene in enduring civil conflicts in the region, such as the ones observed in South Sudan and Somalia (Byiers, 2017).

Overlapping Memberships and Coordination Challenges

The issue of overlapping constituencies between countries and regional institutions has a considerable impact on the region of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Numerous member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) engage in multiple affiliations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as a result of various political, economic, and strategic factors. Based on the above figure, it is evident that all member nations of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), except Somalia and South Sudan, are also member states of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The Socio-political and Economic Cost of South Sudan Conflict

Year	Number of death Men		Malnourished children	Food security crisis	Property loss	Economic and social displacement
2013-2018	400,000				US$22.3 billion	4.56 million
2018-2022	1,177,600 deaths due to any cause	Death by violent injury 190,000	1.4 million	7.7 million	$28 billion Spending on security $2.2 billion	11.6 million

Source: United Nations Human Right Commission report November 2022
Table2 Economic Loss Net Present values in Real GDP

Conflict Scenario	Billions of US dollars		Loss as percentage of 2014 GDP	
	5 years	20 years	5 years	20 years
Low 1	22.3	121.8	187%	1024%
Low 2	23.9	123.5	201%	1039%
Moderate	27.2	134.6	229%	1132%
High 1	28.2	147.4	237%	1239%
High 2	28.2	158.0	237%	1328%

Source: Frontier Economics

Conflict Scenario	Billions of US dollars		Loss as percentage of 2014 GDP	
	5 years	20 years	5 years	20 years
Low 1	1.8	2.0	15%	17%
Low 2	3.4	3.7	28%	31%
Moderate	6.7	14.8	57%	124%
High 1	7.7	27.5	65%	231%
High 2	7.7	38.1	65%	321%

Source: Frontier Economics

Source: Frontier Economic 2013

Table 3 Regional Direct Cost

	Moderate Conflict		High Conflict 1		High Conflict 2	
	5 years	20 years	5 years	20 years	5 years	20 years
Ethiopia	0	0	3.39	9.30	3.39	15.07
	(0%)	(0%)	(6.8%)	(18.6%)	(6.8%)	(30.2%)
Kenya	0	0	5.69	14.92	5.69	24.33
	(0%)	(0%)	(9.1%)	(23.8%)	(9.1%)	(38.8%)
Tanzania	0	0	1.71	4.72	1.71	7.60
	(0%)	(0%)	(4.7%)	(12.9%)	(4.7%)	(20.8%)
Sudan	0.77	1.5	1.01	2.79	1.01	4.49
	(1.1%)	(2.1%)	(1.4%)	(4.0%)	(1.4%)	(6.4%)
Uganda	0.94	1.91	1.16	3.18	1.16	5.18
	(3.6%)	(7.3%)	(4.5%)	(12.2%)	(4.5%)	(19.8%)
TOTAL	1.17	3.4	12.96	34.9	12.96	56.7
	(1.0%)	(1.9%)	(7.4%)	(19.9%)	(7.4%)	(32.3%)

Source: Frontier Economics

Source: Frontier Economic 2013

Table 4 Breakdown of international Cost

	Low	Medium	High
Costs incurred within South Sudan	1.7	8.7	21.3
Regional humanitarian responses	1.14	6.3	11
TOTAL	2.84	15.0	32.3

Source: Frontier Economics

Source: Frontier Economic 2013

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have played a major role in the resolution of the challenges faced in South Sudan. The endeavors undertaken to facilitate negotiations, enhance public consciousness, and secure the commitment of involved parties have yielded favorable outcomes, particularly in relation to the implementation of a framework for peace and security. Contrary to the aforementioned assertion, research conducted by many sources indicates that the Peace and Security architecture implemented by the African Union (AU) has not demonstrated significant efficacy in mitigating the prevalence of violence within the context of South Sudan.

The research findings demonstrate that the architectural components were meticulously strategized with the objective of resolving the civil war within the nation. Additionally, the efficacy of the Panel of the Wise technique in devising strategies to mitigate conflicts was observed, highlighting its potential as a means to reshape the narrative surrounding the issues at hand.

II.   Conclusion

The African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have collaboratively established a regional security community in the Horn of Africa. This initiative aims to enhance the assurance of peace and security in the region, in accordance with the AU Peace and Security Architecture and the provisions outlined in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. The original goal of the United

Nations (UN) regarding the involvement of regional organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the global pursuit of peace and security was significantly hindered by the Cold War and the resulting deadlock in the UN Security Council caused by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The occurrence of conflicts on the African continent has experienced a notable reduction due to the concerted endeavors of regional and continental peace and security frameworks, such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). By embracing the future directions proposed by AU as discussed in this chapter, AU has the potential to enhance its existing significant contribution to peace and security in the volatile Horn of Africa region. This would enable AU to evolve from an early stage to a more developed Regional Security Complex (RSC), as conceptualized by constructivist scholars Adler and Barnett in their work on Security Communities.

Nevertheless, a crucial inquiry remains regarding the potential of the existing political settlement framework in South Sudan to foster both political stability and economic prosperity, as theorized by scholars such as Khan (2010). The demonstration of political determination by various political leaders in South Sudan, along with the engagement of influential parties such as IGAD and Troika, indicates a promising trajectory.

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